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Abstract— This paper explores the implications of 
decentralized autonomous organisations by examining a 
Blockchain operating system for collective intelligence called 
DAOStack. This technology may affect the role of IT directors 
in the future because it provides ways to effectively automate 
governance practices. The paper details a comparative analysis 
of decision-making factors in hierarchical organisations and 
decentralized autonomous organisations. The study suggests 
that although these modern organisations facilitate 
collaboration and decision making for directors, it is 
recommended that directors lean more toward influence-
oriented skills as opposed to traditional control-based 
governance approaches. This can be done by making use of 
tacit knowledge, acting as the facilitators and relinquishing 
certain aspects of traditional powers and authority to the 
community. 
Keywords: IT Governance, Blockchain, Decentralised 
Autonomous Organisations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Decentralised Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a 
computer program that runs a distributed peer to peer 
network [1]. DAOs are created to operate without human 
involvement. They are controlled by communities that aim to 
re-engineer certain aspects of corporate governance. This is 
done by programming organisational processes into code. 
The code runs on a digital distributed ledger known as 
blockchain. 
This paper will not cover the technical details of 
blockchain technology, however basic knowledge of 
blockchain may help to understand the implications of 
DAOs. 
To address the relationship between traditional IT 
governance and governance in DAOs, the paper will 
examine an existing operating system for collective 
intelligence called DAOStack. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In centralised organisations, the power and authority to 
make decisions is held by executive members or top-level 
management. This creates a hierarchy decision-making 
structure where the top-level employees control and direct 
the organisation.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum are decentralized 
organisations where decision-making is delegated and is 
flexible. This means that executives assign part of their 
responsibilities to management and communicate often to 
oversee processes. 
A DAO is similar to a decentralized organisation; 
however, the key difference is that DAOs are autonomous 
and exist in a digital format. DAOs rely on distributed ledger 
technology to record and enforce decisions and 
organizational processes. This could include aspects like 
issuing shares, appointing a CEO, voting on proposals, and 
paying salaries [2]. 
The following is a thought experiment on a use case of an 
autonomous agent [3]: 
Imagine a self-driving electric car is programmed to 
cruise around in search for passengers. After successfully 
picking up and dropping off passengers, the car decides to 
head to a charging station and use its profits to recharge its 
battery. Aside from the initial programming, there is no 
human intervention or control in helping determine the car’s 
mission. 
This idea describes how DAOs could help power 
leaderless organisations in the future. The concept is that if 
Bitcoin can do away with financial middle men, one day 
organisations can operate without hierarchical management.  
To understand how the roles of IT Directors on 
DAOStack would be affected by autonomy it is important to 
identify some of the typical processes or tasks associated 
with roles like Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO). The next section looks at 
traditional governance success factors and common IT 
Governance responsibilities. 
A. Responsibilities of IT Directors 
Every organisation is unique and may require different 
responsibilities from their IT directors. This often depends on 
the size of the organisation and the scope within the 
enterprise. The industry will also have an impact on the role 
of the director. For example, government, non-profit, 
healthcare sectors require IT directors but in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, regardless of the industry, there are 
broad and common responsibilities that all IT directors share 
[4]. These are listed below: 
• Developing and overseeing SMART 1  metrics for 
hardware, software, and storage. 
• Guaranteeing a strategic capacity plan 
• Liaising with senior level IT managers, making 
hiring decisions, handling employee performance. 
                                                          
1 Mnemonic acronym for Specific, Measurable, Accurate, 
Reliable and Timely. 
Dr Shopee Dube  
University of Johanensburg 
Department of Applied Information Systems 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
shopeed@uj.ac.za 
 
Melina Mutambaie Katende  
University of Johanensburg 
Department of Applied Information Systems 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
melmut@live.co.za 
 
• Communicating and collaborating with the 
technology team. 
• Determining business requirements for IT systems. 
• Coordinating IT activities to ensure the security, 
privacy and availability of data and network 
services. 
• Managing IT risk to an acceptable level. 
• Overseeing budgets and financial forecasts. 
• Implementing IT related policies from board 
members and reporting back. 
• Identifying and recommending new technology 
solutions. 
Now that we have outlined some of the key 
responsibilities of IT directors, we can explore the building 
blocks of DAOStack to establish how it incorporates some of 
governance responsibilities into code.  
III. ACTORS IN DAOSTACK - AGENCIES 
The foundation of DAOs are smart companies or 
agencies. A smart agency is an atomic governance unit that is 
managed and operated with smart contracts [5]. Agencies 
should have their own tokens, reputation systems and 
governance system. The token is associated with the 
company’s resources, the reputation is based on the 
credibility in company matters and the governance system 
consists of the bylaws that are written and executed in smart 
contracts. 
The agency can come up with any suitable bylaws to 
create a governance protocol [5]. An example of one is a 
proposal-based governance system. This allows members of 
the network to vote whether they agree or disagree to 
company proposals. A majority vote is required for approval 
and execution. The execution is an automated action once 
approved. Proposals could be about shareholding, token 
distribution, or any other endeavour in the company. The 
votes can be weighted by voter reputation or any other 
attribute deemed necessary. Fig.1 is a heuristic visualization 
of what this could look like: 
In Fig. 1, the solid balls represent agents within the 
company and the proximity to the center indicates their 
influence or reputation (the closer they are to the center, the 
stronger their influence or reputation). The size of the solid 
balls reflects the quantity of tokens the agents possess. In this 
example, an agent is proposing to allocate five Ethereum 
tokens (ETH) to Agent A for her contribution to fixing a bug 
XXX.  
The agents of the company vote and the majority, 
weighted by reputation, approve of this transfer. The contract 
automatically executes the suggested token allocation. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. Schematic Blockchain Company [1]. 
 
 
This example could be adjusted in relation to traditional 
IT governance practices, the same could be done for: 
• Determining and approving business requirements 
for IT systems. 
• Approving the purchase of new software or 
hardware for the company. 
• Implementing policies that are chosen by executives 
(or agents with large reputation or stake). 
 
It is clear to see that administrative tasks  and decision 
making can be automated in a DAO. 
The tasks and decisions are guided by rules that cannot 
be broken, they can only be edited in accordance with the 
agency policies themselves. They may or may not be 
autonomous depending on the agencies chosen governance 
system. For example, the agency can reserve a veto option on 
its own decision-making process for another agency [5]. 
The next section will examine the different topologies of 
DAOs in DAOStack. 
IV. TOPOLOGIES OF DAOS 
 
1) Assembly Mode 
The in the Assembly mode, numerous agents take part in 
decision-making within a single agency. This is done via 
smart contracts, assuming reputation or stake represents 
decision-making power. This model is distributed fairly. This 
simple mode is difficult to scale due to the technical capacity 
to process data while maintaining resilience.  Scalability and 
resilience will be addressed in the next section.  
2) Fractal Federal Governance mode 
The fractal federal mode is extreme in the sense that the 
DAO exists as an agency within a few agents, where each 
agent itself is an agency with agents. 
3) Complex mesh-network 
The complex Mesh network arises from agencies within 
the infrastructure provided by the DAO stack. The 
governance part of DAOstack lies within the agency. Agency 
is a unit of governance in a state-transition function [5], that 
collects inputs from agents with blockchain addresses and 
executes an output in terms of the state transition (Fig.2) . 
 
 
Fig. 2. Governance State Transition [1] 
 
 
The following is an example of this state transition function: 
 
A simple agency called “Fundis” manages an ETH fund. 
This agency has its own native token called FND. The 
agency has three basic governance rules: 
 
1. The first rule is that the only company-wide 
decision that the agency takes is to make 
investments. This is done by sending ETH from 
the main wallet to a certain blockchain address. 
An agent within the company can initiate the 
action by proposing to send a specified amount 
of ETH to address A. Then all agents vote yes or 
no to the proposal, each vote is weighted by the 
number of FND that the vote has in their 
address.  
2. The second rule is that upon establishment, FND 
tokens are issued to buyers for a period of one 
week. The rate is one FND per ETH. 
3. The third rule is that any FND owner can send 
their token to the main Fundis wallet and in 
return get a share of the ETH. This is based on 
the existing ETH in the Fundis wallet at the 
moment. When the owner of the FND does this, 
the FND sent is destroyed in their wallet.  
 
As simple as this three-rule governance system is, there are 
some immediate issues. They are: 
a) It may be difficult get a majority vote on a 
proposal using weighting by stake. This issue is 
related to governance scalability. Which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
b) A 51% attack can hack this governance system. 
This can occur when a single agent has enough 
liquid capital to obtain more than half of the 
FND in the network. This results in one 
individual dominating the votes and influencing 
the governance of the DAO. This problem is 
related to resilience. 
c) It is uncertain that the agents who hold the most 
tokens would make the best investment 
decisions. This brings up the question of 
meritocracy. This can be solved by assigning 
reputation tokens. 
d) Another risk is if an agent proposes that all 
Fundis ETH be distributed into the addresses of 
agents that vote yes on a proposal. This scenario 
demonstrates that resilience is a complex issue 
to solve.  
e) Lastly, the creators of Fundi might eventually 
realize that the governance system is flawed. 
However, once the agency has been deployed 
that problem will be out of their control because 
the system is not upgradable. 
 
In the Fundis example, there are four types of inputs that 
agents can make in the organisations: 
• They can submit a proposal,  
• They can vote yes or no,  
• They can buy FND with ETH from the agency 
• They can send FND to the agency to claim back the 
ETH.  
 
Fundis as a DAO has three possible automated actions it 
can make based on the rules of its governance system: 
• Issue and send FND to send agents in the first 
week. 
• Send ETH from its main wallet to agents who want 
to reclaim, whilst destroyed the agents FND. 
• Send ETH to an address after a success proposal 
from the network. 
V. SOLVING THE FUNDIS PROBLEM 
Instead of basing the votes on the number of tokens that 
agents hold, the company can create various balance sheets 
that denote the influence of agents. 
Generally, an agent cannot transfer reputation scores to 
another agent. It would not be practical to lend one’s 
reputation to someone else. However, it is possible that a 
company can create different types of reputation categories 
that can be assigned to different roles or in different 
situations. Thereby forming a meritocratic governance 
system that is based on the unique contributions of agents.  
One method of allocating reputation would be via 
proposals that are directly linked to the contributions or work 
performed, which can be recorded in the blockchain. 
Reputation can also be programmed to include payments for 
agents that have been awarded reputation tokens. In 
DAOStack, this concept is called reputation flow [5]. 
VI. TYPES OF DAO GOVERNANCE ACTIONS 
There are two types of actions that can be programmed 
into the governance of a DAO [5]. There are permissible and 
forbidden actions.  
Permissible Actions are operational rules that trigger the 
agency functionalities. For example, if the majority of 
reputation holders approve a proposal to issue a token, a 
token will automatically be issued. This will be based on 
smart contract triggers set out the governance schemes.  
Forbidden Actions are the restrictions that must be 
respected and cannot be violated, even by an approved 
scheme. For example, if the DAO approves one million 
tokens, token-issuance schemes will only function as long as 
the sum of the tokens issues is less than one million. These 
are called global constraints. Constraints can be upgradable if 
a predefined condition has been met.  
In DAOStack, global constraints and governance 
schemes are denoted in elements.  Such elements provide 
protocols for governance and protocols to change the main 
protocols. 
VII. THE DAO HACK 
In June 17 2016, a decentralised venture capital fund 
called The DAO was attacked by unknown hackers who 
exploited vulnerabilities in the smart contracts.  
It is easy to be convinced that DAOs are an ideal solution 
to governance, but it is important to see them objectively as 
well.  
The problem occurred due to an external call present in a 
codepath2 that should have been allowed to be executed once 
per stakeholder [6]. This codepath was placed before a 
section of the code that revokes the rights of stakeholders to 
trigger the codepath after its first execution. This 
vulnerability allowed the hacker to repeatedly execute the 
codepath , thereby draining excessive funds from the contract 
than should have been possible.  
The hacker managed to drain 3.6 million ETH, which 
was worth approximately $50 Million at the time. 
Fortunately, the funds were locked for 28 days due to the 
nature of the system, which prevents creators of Child-DAOs 
from withdrawing assets for a total of 27 days after creating 
the address. This time frame gave the community a chance to 
diverge the protocol of the Ethereum chain to refund 
investors. 
Technically speaking, the hacker ran a valid smart 
contract on the system. However, it was ill-intentioned and 
manipulative. 
This is an aspect of DAOs that are difficult to manage 
because they stem from humans, which some may argue are 
more difficult to govern than systems. The next section will 
focus on how this hack could have been prevented.  
Considering that up to 5% of all smart contracts are 
potentially in danger [6], the demand for a decentralised 
auditing platforms and good governance grows. 
VIII. TACIT VS EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE IN BUSINESS 
The cohesion of explicit and tacit knowledge are key 
parts in creating and understanding the dynamics of 
knowledge in an organisation [7]. 
Explicit knowledge is used in a company to help sustain 
organizational procedures, generate, and articulate 
information and data accordingly [8].  
                                                          
2 Programming term for code execution paths in the 
compiler in which execution time is spent. 
Compared to Tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge is 
easier to transfer and map out in computer systems because it 
is direct and requires a lower level of context to be 
understood [9]. Explicit knowledge is found in: databases, 
memos, notes, documents, etc [7].  
On the other hand, Tacit knowledge, which is knowledge 
that is stored in every person through his or her experiences, 
intuitions and observations [8] is more difficult to transfer.  
In the case of The DAO Hack, it would have required 
some experience and a strong technical background to 
identify the flaw in the code. Mostly because, at face value, 
there was nothing inherently wrong with the algorithm. It 
required strategic thinking to find ways to manipulate the 
system. 
Solidity, the programming language used to build the 
DAO, was invented in 2014. The hack occurred in 2016, 
giving the community of developers two years to familiarise 
themselves with all aspects of the protocols. 
A combination of explicit and tacit knowledge on smart 
contracts, information security and hacking could have been 
instrumental in preventing the DAO hack. However, 
considering that DAOs are relatively new in the IT industry, 
there is a severe skill shortage in the space [9].   
This case highlights that knowledge accumulated with 
years of experience is not only lacking in DAOs, but difficult 
to transfer in a digital environment where participants are 
spread out across the world. This type of knowledge does not 
replace explicit knowledge, but it plays a key role in 
monitoring, controlling and evaluating activities in DAOs.   
IX. COMPARISON OF IT GOVERNANCE FACTORS IN DAOS 
AND HIERARCHICAL ORGANISATIONS 
To establish whether DAOs extend or reduce the 
traditional roles of IT directors, this section will include a 
comparative study on the factors of IT governance that are 
considered for decision making in hierarchical organisations 
and DAOs. 
Governance factors taken from COBIT’s IT Governance 
definition were used as the main frame of reference. This 
will help to establish whether one case extends, corroborates, 
contradicts or corrects the other.  
The ground for comparison is that both organisational 
models are designed to direct and control enterprises. 
Hierarchical organisations are traditional and widely 
adopted, whereas DAOs are a novel modern concept. It is 
important to note that DAOs are still being developed and 
experimented on and have not reached mainstream adoption. 
Various organisations are exploring the possibilities of 
DAOs in common human endeavour [1][2]. It is likely that 
further research will ensue to expand on these frameworks. 
It must be noted that in Table 1.1 observations are 
depicted from on the guidelines of DAOStack and The 
Control Objective for Information and related technologies 
(COBIT) and are simply high-level representations of the 
details elaborated in the respective white papers and reports. 
These factors were selected to reveal the differences and 
similarities between DAOs and Hierarchical organizations. 
 
 
TABLE I - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE MODELS 
 
Governance Factors Hierarchical Organisations DAOStack 
Managing 
Stakeholders 
Different strategies are used to manage 
internal and external stakeholders.  
Stakeholders exist within the DAO as agents with 
influence weightings. Stakeholders can vote on 
certain decisions in the organisation. 
Stakeholder Needs Stakeholder needs can conflict, but they are 
often used to form organisational objectives.  
Stakeholder can create proposals documenting their 
needs. These proposals must abide by the main 
governance protocol’s permissible actions.  
Organisational 
objectives 
Objectives are based on a flexible framework 
that includes principles such as:  
• Alignment of IT and business strategy, 
• Managed IT-related business risk, 
• Delivery of IT services in line with 
business requirements. 
Using tacit and organisational 
knowledge, it is easier to identify high level 
objectives. 
 
Objectives are programmed into the governance 
protocol. E.g. Majority voting for Profit margins, 
Voting on Service Level Agreements, Assigning Key 
Performance Indicators. 
High level objectives must be transcribed into 
measurable tasks that can be codified in the system.  
Decision-making Requires a balance of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. This includes tacit 
knowledge, interpreting hard data, intuition, 
creating and managing reports and 
conversations.  
Responsibility and Accountability of 
decisions are held by individuals. E.g. CIO or 
CTO. 
Decision-making power spread between individuals. 
Tokens like reputation or shareholding can be used to 
weigh decision power. The is recorded on the 
Blockchain. The process of making a decision is 
incentivised, transparent and requires a majority vote, 
the outcome is executed automatically. 
 
Providing Value to 
the business 
Directors provide value by controlling, 
monitoring and evaluating the organisation. 
This requires them to make informed 
decisions and take accountability for those 
decisions.  
 
Value lies in the automated decision making, 
automatic execution of decisions, transparency, 
accuracy, resilience and meritocracy. Accountability 
of decisions is spread across voters. 
Compliance to IT 
rules and regulation 
Internal and external auditors can be 
appointed to examine and analyze 
compliance. This process does not severely 
interfere with organisational activity. 
IT rules and regulation are programmed as schemes in 
the smart-contract framework of DAOStack. 
Protocols must be upgraded when external or internal 
laws have changed. This may affect the performance 
of the DAO. 
 
Managing Risk Directors are expected to recognize pain 
points and triggers related to IT risk such as 
data loss or project failure. All documented 
risks must be controlled at an acceptable 
level. 
 
Pain point and triggers can be included in the main 
protocol. If they occur, directors can be automatically 
notified. 
IT Security Requires collaboration from all levels of an 
organisation and involves both IT and non-I 
T departments. IT Security policies are set by 
Board members, interpreted as managerial 
procedures and formed into operational 
processes.  
Security risks should be assessed at inception in 
DAOs. It is difficult to refactor code after the DAO 
has been deployed. The advantage is that individuals 
cannot compromise the system. The disadvantage is 
that protocols may be “technically” correct by can be 
bypassed by manipulation. 
 
X. CONCLUSION  
The paper examined the implications of decentralized 
autonomous organisations and how they include common 
decision-making practices. The DAO topologies were 
outlined and an example of how to solve collaboration 
problems was described. Evidently, DAOs to reduce the 
decision-making power of directors by recording and 
codifying explicit knowledge and organisational processes. 
This is beneficial in reducing the the risk of human error. 
DAOs are an efficient way of systematically conducting 
corporate voting, facilitating decision-making by automating 
tasks such as appointing CEOs, paying salaries, proposing 
service level agreements. DAOStack demonstrates that smart 
agencies can function based on community rules, global 
constraints and business logic. 
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The example of DAOStack and other platforms [1][2] 
indicate that in the future, the responsibilities of directors 
will be less focused on control-based tasks. Many of the 
examples given highlight democratic, peer to peer decision 
making. However, it is evident that influence-oriented skills 
are necessary from directors and that tacit knowledge cannot 
be replaced by DAOs because of its implicit nature and lack 
of transferability. 
It is recommended that IT Professionals, entrepreneurs, 
and educational institutions prepare for the global digital 
economy by encouraging influence-oriented skills as 
opposed to control-based skills in governance. This is 
because blockchain technology reduces the decision-making 
authority of directors, by relying on programmable 
governance protocols. The growing decentralized 
environment in which a growing number of firms are 
choosing to operate demands that IT is used to achieve 
organizational efficiency. This will require that IT leaders in 
Blockchain are orchestrators and not mechanics.  
CIOs and CTO in DAOs must take on modern 
governance approaches to add the most value. This can be 
done by expanding their scope of duties, relinquishing 
traditional powers and authority and focusing on acting as 
facilitators.  
 
[1] Overy, A. &. (2016). Decentralized Autonomous Organisations. Allen 
& Overy LLP. 
[2] eInc. (2017). eInc. BLOCKCHAIN Based ORGANISATIONS. 
Retrieved from einc.io/: https://einc.io/ 
[3] Hearn, M. (2017, March). Mike Hearn: Autonomous agents, self-
driving cars and Bitcoin. Youtube, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVyv4t0OKe4 . Last accessed 
18 August 2018 
[4] ISACA. (2012). COBIT 5. In ISACA (Ed.), A Business Framework 
for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT. Illinois: 
ISACA. 
[5] DAOStack. (2018). White Paper V1.1. DAOStack. 
[6] Block Cast. (2016). The biggest smart contract hacks in history or 
how to endanger up to US $2.2 billion. Retrieved from Medium: 
<https://medium.com/solidified/the-biggest-smart-contract-hacks-in-
history-or-how-to-endanger-up-to-us-2-2-billion-d5a72961d15d last 
accessed August 2018>. 
[7] Computer Business Research. (2018, August). Explicit Knowledge. 
Retrieved from Computer Business Research: 
http://www.computerbusinessresearch.com/Home/enterprise-
resource-planning-and-collaborative-systems/explicit-
knowledge/explicit-knowledge . Last Accessed August 2018 
[8] Evans, N., & Smith, M. E. (2001). THREE TYPES OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE: Lancaster: Lancaster 
University. 
[9] Brézillon, P., & Pomerol, J. C. (2002). Is Context a Kind of 
Collective Tacit Knowledge? Paris: University of Paris. 
[10] Castillo, M. d. (2017, March). Lack of Blockchain Talent is 
Becoming an Industry Concern. Retrieved from CoinDesk: 
https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-hiring-difficulties-becoming-
industry-concern/ Last Accessed August 2018 
 
 
  
 
